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Philosophy of Ethnobiology: 
Understanding Knowledge Integration and Its Limitations 
 
Ethnobiology has become increasingly concerned with applied and normative issues such as 
climate change adaptation, forest management, and sustainable agriculture. Applied 
ethnobiology emphasizes the practical importance of local and traditional knowledge in 
tackling these issues but thereby also raises complex theoretical questions about the 
integration of heterogeneous knowledge systems. The aim of this article is to develop a 
framework for addressing questions of integration through four core domains of philosophy - 
epistemology, ontology, value theory, and political theory. In each of these dimensions, we 
argue for a model of “partial overlaps” that acknowledges both substantial similarities and 
differences between knowledge systems. While overlaps can ground successful collaboration, 
their partiality requires reflectivity about the limitations of collaboration and co-creation. By 
outlining such a general and programmatic framework, the article aims to contribute to 
developing “philosophy of ethnobiology” as a field of interdisciplinary exchange that provides 
new resources for addressing foundational issues in ethnobiology and also expands the agenda 
of philosophy of biology.  
 
Keywords: Ethnobiological Theory, Interdisciplinarity, Knowledge Integration, Normativity, 
Philosophy of Ethnobiology 
 
Ethnobiology has become widely concerned with questions of knowledge integration in 
complex multi-stakeholder settings. While ethnobiologists document biological knowledge of 
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local communities, they also increasingly emphasize the practical relevance of this knowledge 
for addressing socio-ecological challenges from health and food security to labor conditions 
and the preservation of biocultural heritage (Cuerrier et al. 2015; Wolverton 2013; Wyndham 
et al. 2011). This emphasis on the local expertise of non-academic actors has put 
ethnobiologists at the center of wider collaborative developments in the life sciences that aim 
for “co-creation”, “co-leadership”, “co-management”, “multi-stakeholder approaches”, 
“participatory action research”, “participatory design”, “upstream engagement”, 
“transdisciplinarity”, and so on (Davidson-Hunt et al. 2012; Gavin et al. 2015; Saslis and 
Lagoudakis 2013; Wolverton et al. 2014a). 
 While ethnobiological contributions to such multi-stakeholder interactions have been 
reflected in a turn towards “applied ethnobiology” (Armstrong and Veteto 2015; Silitoe 2006; 
Wolverton 2013; Whyte 2018), it would be a mistake to assume that they reduce the need for 
careful theoretical reflection. On the contrary, applied and especially collaborative perspectives 
in ethnobiology raise complex philosophical questions about the prospects and limitations of 
integrating knowledge systems of heterogeneous stakeholders. First, there is the 
epistemological challenge (Marlor 2010; Wilson 2008) that traditional communities and 
academically trained scientists often rely on very different methods for producing and 
validating knowledge, from spiritual norms of ecological engagement to computational 
modelling of ecological dynamics. Second, there is the ontological challenge (Ellen 2016; 
Ludwig 2018b) of collaborating in the light of very different assumptions about reality as 
reflected in anthropological accounts of issues such as the mental life of plants and forests 
(Kohn 2013) or the status of rivers as persons (Hutchison 2014). Third, there is the ethical 
challenge (Anderson 1996; Whyte 2015; Wolverton et al. 2016) that epistemic and ontological 
assumptions are intertwined with different value systems such as contrasting ways of thinking 
about moral responsibilities between human and non-human agents. Finally, there is the 
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political challenge (Ludwig 2016b; Nadasdy 2003) that stakeholders often hold very different 
positions of power to enforce their epistemological, ontological, and ethical perspectives in 
collaborative practice.  
 Despite the interdisciplinary orientation of ethnobiological research, none of these 
epistemological, ontological, and normative challenges have led to a sustained interaction 
between ethnobiology and academic philosophy. The aim of this article is to outline a 
framework for bringing ethnobiology together with philosophical research to address 
fundamental challenges of multi-stakeholder processes. The next section introduces a general 
framework of “partial overlaps” that contrasts with overly optimistic accounts of philosophical 
universalism and pessimistic perspectives on cross-cultural incommensurability. The following 
sections develop this framework in four philosophical core domains of ontology, epistemology, 
value theory, and political theory. The final section provides a synthesizing discussion about 
the role of philosophical reflectivity for ethnobiological research.  
 
A Methodology of Partial Overlaps 
 
Global challenges such as climate change (Wolverton et al 2014b), deforestation (Alves and 
Albuquerque 2012), and food security (Nolan and Pieroni 2014) have to be addressed through 
the inclusion of heterogeneous stakeholders. A crucial element in the development of multi-
stakeholder processes is the recognition of local expertise about environments and sustainable 
practices (Byskov 2017; Whyte and Crease 2010). For example, Indigenous hunters will often 
be able to monitor endangered species, traditional farmers have rich expertise about sustainable 
agroforestry, and local fishers tend to be the first to notice changes in marine, estuarine and 
riverine ecosystems. 
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 Ethnobiology can play an important role in spelling out this idea of local expertise by 
documenting the complexity of traditional knowledge beyond academic research. For example, 
Berlin and Berlin’s (1996:3) classical account of Medical Ethnobiology of the Highland Maya 
of Chiapas does not only provide a detailed documentation of a specialized body of local 
knowledge but also explicitly argues “that the ethnobiological knowledge of traditional peoples 
conforms in many respects to basic scientific principles”. Emphasizing both the complexity of 
traditional knowledge and its compatibility with modern science, ethnobiology appears to be 
an ideal resource for transdisciplinary knowledge integration that synthesizes the expertise of 
very different stakeholders in developing better responses to socio-ecological challenges 
(Albuquerque et al. 2017; Nabhan 2009, 2016).  
 While ethnobiology provides resources for knowledge integration, there has also been 
increased concern about the limitations and adverse effects of integration projects. For 
example, Nadasdy’s (2003) influential critique of Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK) 
has emphasized that optimistic visions of knowledge integration often obscure differences 
between stakeholders and thereby reproduce hierarchies between scientists and local 
communities in the negotiation of practice and policy (Lertzman 2009). Often, holders of TEK 
need to prove the value of their knowledge by showing that it holds up to the methodological 
and epistemological criteria of academic researchers. As a consequence, TEK is required to be 
validated through academic criteria but academic research is not regarded in need of validation 
through compliance with TEK. This imbalance can create what philosophers have called 
“testimonial injustice” (Fricker 2007; Wanderer 2011; Anderson 2012) and contribute to 
practices that treat TEK as a resource for novel data while ignoring aspects of TEK that 
challenge the assumptions of academically trained scientists.    
As Ludwig and Poliseli (2018) have argued, this situation can be described as a 
dilemma between assimilation and division. On the one hand, critics of overly optimistic 
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integration ideals like Nadasdy are correct to point out the danger of downplaying differences 
between knowledge systems and therefore obscuring unique features of ethnobiological 
knowledge (see also El-Hani and Bandeira 2008). On the other hand, overly pessimistic 
accounts of incommensurable knowledge systems are equally problematic from both 
theoretical and political perspectives. First, philosophers have questioned whether the idea of 
entirely incommensurable knowledge systems is coherent in the first place (Davidson 1984; 
Putnam 1981). While anthropological discussions of the ontological turn (Holbraad and 
Pedersen 2017) often postulate a “radical alterity” of “different worlds” (Henare et al. 2007; 
Alberti et al 2011; cf. Graeber 2015), this literature does little in addressing theoretical worries 
about the coherence of incommensurability and radical metaphysical claims about different 
worlds often remain philosophically obscure. Furthermore, claims about incommensurable 
worlds also come with political risks as they seem to undermine the very possibility of 
productive interaction between heterogeneous stakeholders. As a result, an exclusive focus on 
difference returns to what Agrawal (1995) has famously criticized as the “divide between 
Indigenous and scientific knowledge” that creates not only artificial boundaries but can also 
contribute to marginalizing traditional knowledge in policy and practice through the 
assumption of insurmountable differences (Hunn 2014).  
 The aim of this article is to develop a nuanced framework for analyzing the relations 
between knowledge systems that avoids a biased focus on either differences or similarities 
through a framework of “partial overlaps”. On the one hand, we propose to develop an analysis 
of overlaps that provide common ground for collaboration and mutual understanding. The 
following sections argue that such overlaps can be identified across core philosophical 
domains, including ontological assumptions about the biological world, epistemological 
strategies for achieving knowledge, say, about biota and environments, and normative 
reasoning about moral relations between human and non-human agents. 
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 While an analysis of overlaps clarifies shared resources for collaboration, we propose 
a complementary analysis of the partiality of such overlaps. Although there may be substantial 
overlaps in fundamental assumptions of traditional and academic knowledge systems, there 
will often also remain substantial differences along ontological, epistemological, and value 
dimensions. For each of these dimensions, the relations between two knowledge systems K1 
and K2 can be visualized through intersecting sets in which the intersection (K1 ∩ K2) 
represents shared assumptions while the relative complements (K1 ∖ K2  ∧ K2 ∖ K1) represent 
(ontological, epistemological, and value) assumptions that are unique to knowledge systems 
(Figure 1).  
 
We argue that such an idea of partial overlaps can provide methodological tools for addressing 
relations between foundational assumptions between (ethno)biological knowledge systems. 
The following sections develop this idea of partial overlaps as a methodological tool through 
four philosophical core domains of ontology, epistemology, value theory, and political theory. 
Application: While this article develops a theoretical and philosophical perspective, it also aims to 
provide an applicable framework for addressing foundational issues in ethnobiological practice. 
Each of the following sections is therefore supplemented by a short example of application from 
our own fieldwork in two fishing villages in the North shore of the state of Bahia, Brazil, situated 
in the estuary of a large river (Itapicuru): Siribinha (ca. 500 inhabitants) and Poças (ca. 600 
inhabitants) (El-Hani et al. forthcoming). While fishing communities in the region are gradually 
disappearing due to the growth of the tourism industry and declining catches resulting from 
overfishing, pollution, and other environmental threats, in these villages we still find a living fishing 
culture (in the Brazilian shore an emergent cultural product from native Tupinamba and Portuguese 
influences, with some African contributions; Ott 1944), with young people learning the traditional 
fishing practices and subsisting from their product (despite also earning their living from tourism), 
and knowledge flowing across generations. These communities use at least a dozen different fishing 
techniques and show a wealth of ethnobiological knowledge, not only about the animals they capture 
(fishes, crustaceans, mollusks), but also about medicinal plants and the local environments. 
Understandably, it has previously attracted the attention of ethnobiologists (e.g., Costa-Neto 2000; 
Costa-Neto and Marques 2000). 
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In each of these cases, we argue that a framework of partial overlaps allows more nuanced 
analyses of foundational issues in ethnobiology that avoid shortcomings of universalism and 
relativism.  
 
Partial Overlaps in Ontologies 
Ontology is one of the core domains of philosophy and is concerned with the question of what 
exists (Quine 1948, Chalmers 2011, Sider 2011). As debates about the “ontological turn” have 
moved to the center of anthropological theory (Holbraad and Pedersen 2017), ethnobiologists 
have also become increasingly concerned with cross-cultural relations among ontological 
assumptions (Daly et al. 2016). In current anthropological theory, emphasis on difference tends 
to dominate recognition of similarity and many influential anthropologists focus on cases of 
radical alterity such as ontological commitments to shamanic transformations (Viveiros de 
Castro 2014) or thinking forests (Kohn 2013).  
 Ludwig (2016b) has suggested that ethnotaxonomic research provides a different but 
complementary angle for investigating cross-cultural relations among ontologies. 
Ethnotaxonomy provides a “bottom-up” strategy that starts with small-scale ontological 
differences, for instance concerning categories of animals and plants, rather than the more 
common anthropological “top-down” strategy that proceeds from the most salient cases of deep 
ontological difference (Ellen 2006, Hunn 2014). By putting ontological relations under the 
“microscope of ethnotaxonomy”, the methodology of partial overlaps can be articulated more 
clearly. On the one hand, there are many salient cases of ontological convergence as illustrated 
by cross-cultural agreement on the boundaries of many biological species. These cases of 
ontological convergence play an important role in ethnotaxonomy and are especially prominent 
in Berlin’s (1992) universalist program. Furthermore, Berlin also provides a metaphysical 
justification of these convergences by appealing to "discrete, discontinuous chunks of 
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biological reality" (1992:81) that can be further specified through philosophical accounts of 
natural kinds and their grounding in causal networks and property clusters (Khalidi 2013; Slater 
2015; see Ludwig 2018a; 2018b for application to ethnobiology).  
 While there is need for substantial philosophical discussion of cross-cultural similarities 
between categories, ethnobiologists have increasingly qualified claims of cross-cultural 
convergence. Nabhan (2016:27) clearly expresses wider developments of the field when 
arguing for a focus on “the anomalies, the unique cultural expressions, and the collisions of 
dissonant taxonomic structures”. Looking at such dissonant taxonomic structures provides a 
microcosmos of ontological difference as culturally unique concerns and local environmental 
factors influence what distinctions between animals and plants are being drawn. At the same 
time, the very fact that dissonant taxonomic structures can often be qualified as “anomalies” 
illustrates that widespread convergence is also found among ethnotaxonomies. 
Addressing both cross-cultural similarities and differences in the categorization of 
animals and plants provides an important application of the wider idea of partial overlaps. 
Indeed, there are cross-cultural ontological similarities that provide the basis for collaborative 
ethnobiological practices which would often not be possible without joint recognition of the 
same biological species. However, there are also ontological differences that matter because 
they often reflect different priorities and concerns about biological and ecological properties 
(Ludwig 2018b). Rather than pushing for a universalist emphasis on cross-cultural similarities 
or a relativist emphasis on differences, a model of partial overlaps suggests a more nuanced 
picture of the relations among ontologies.  
 Can this picture of partial overlaps be extended from categories of animals and plants 
to wider ontological issues as commonly debated by anthropologists in the context of the 
“ontological turn”? It can indeed be fruitful to explore the framework of partial ontological 
overlaps in the context of these wider issues. Much of the anthropological literature has focused 
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on salient cases of ontological difference but it would be a mistake to assume that there are no 
substantial overlaps. For example, consider Kohn’s influential discussion of How Forests Think 
(2013). In part, fascination with Kohn’s discussion comes from the ontological difference 
between the Runa of Ecuador’s upper Amazon who take forests to be thinking agents and 
Western scholars who often reserve “thinking” for a much narrower set of organisms such as 
humans and some other mammals. In part, however, fascination with Kohn’s account also 
comes from sufficient ontological overlap. The idea of thinking forests is not so alien that 
Kohn’s descriptions become unintelligible to (non-Runa) readers. On the contrary, part of the 
fascination with thinking forests is that they do appear as a genuine ontological option that 
many readers can at least partly relate to. Indeed, radical expansions of the realm of cognition 
are very much part of the Western intellectual heritage and are also reflected in current 
controversies about plant cognition (Adams 2018; Segundo-Ortin and Calvo 2018).  
Of course, this does not mean that ontological assumptions can always be integrated 
and proponents of the “ontological turn” in anthropology often emphasize deep cross-cultural 
differences. For example, Viveiros de Castro’s (2014) discussion of shamanic transformation 
aims at fundamentally different metaphysical perspectives on the relations between human and 
non-human that challenge optimistic accounts of ontological integration. Again, accounts of 
ontological overlaps need to be complemented with analyses of their partiality that leave room 
for deep cross-cultural disagreement about ontological matters.  
To sum up, the idea of partial overlaps provides a useful guide for thinking about 
ontological relationships from fine-grained questions about the boundaries of plants and 
animals to general ontological issues such as animism and the boundaries of “cognition”. It 
therefore constitutes an alternative to the one-sided focus on ontological similarity that has 
dominated large parts of the Berlinian tradition of ethnotaxonomy and the focus on ontological 
difference that dominates large parts of current anthropological theory. As such, it provides 
10 
ethnobiologists with a sharper and more nuanced framework for addressing ontological 
relationships in multi-stakeholder processes.   
 
Partial Overlaps in Epistemology 
 
It has become widely argued in contemporary philosophy of science that “the scientific 
method” in singular does not exist (Laudan 1983; Andersen and Hepburn 2015). Of course, 
there are common characteristics of scientific practices such as experimentation, modeling and 
mathematization, but none of them provide necessary and sufficient conditions of science that 
are applicable from cultural anthropology to quantum physics. While the lack of a simple 
demarcation criterion for science is hardly a new philosophical insight, it has important 
Application: Partially overlapping ontologies can be found in our field study in traditional fishing 
villages in Brazil. Consider, for instance, the ethnobiology of Buteogallus aequinoctialis (locally 
known as Gacici, in English Rufous crab-hawk, a near threatened species, 
https://www.iucnredlist.org/species/22695808/131937283). Cross-cultural taxonomic convergence 
is clear: fishing communities and academic zoologists uncontroversially refer to the same species, 
despite having different knowledge about it. Ethnobiological research leads to new insights about 
Gacici, as there is almost nothing published on the biology of the species. It is from traditional 
knowledge that we learn, for example, that this hawk calls when the tide turns: their calls are used 
by the fishermen as indication that the tide will be low after some time and they need to retrieve the 
captured fishes. This is a clear inference from traditional knowledge, even expressed in a local 
saying, Gacici cantou, a maré vazou, free translation: Gacici sang, the tide turned. Other insights 
derive from academic research rather than traditional knowledge. For example, the presence of the 
species in the mangroves, as a specialist top predator, is a bioindicator of how well-conserved the 
mangroves are, despite use by the villagers, which thus may be sustainable at least to some extent. 
Epistemic productivity of knowledge integration can also be shown, due both to the sum of unique 
inferences from each knowledge system and to novel inferences using insights from both systems. 
For instance, one may conjecture that Gacici calls when the tide turns to signal for a conspecific 
with which it hunts together the availability of crabs for foraging (perhaps the calls are used as 
signals shared by a couple, as some raptors are known to form lasting couples and hunt together). 
This is at least a hypothesis worth testing. Our field studies also show, however, the partiality of 
overlaps in taxonomy. If we consider, for instance, the two local species of sandpipers (small and 
large sandpipers – maçaricos pequeno and grande), we will be able to see a correspondence between 
two ethnospecies and at least eleven scientific species. Small sandpipers include, for instance, Actitis 
macularis, Arenaria interpres, Calidris alba, Calidris pusilla, Charadrius collaris, Charadrius 
semipalmatus, while large sandpipers include Numenius hudsonicus, Tringa melanoleuca, Tringa 
semipalmata, Pluvialis squatarola, Limnodromus griseus.  
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implications for thinking about epistemic relations between traditional and academic 
knowledge in ethnobiology.  
Under the assumption of a general demarcation criterion, one could aim to investigate 
whether local ethnobiological knowledge systems meet the essential criterion for science. 
Without a clear demarcation criterion, comparisons of knowledge systems lead to more 
ambiguous diagnoses as traditional knowledge shares some but not all epistemic features with 
academic biological knowledge. Given an expansion of the idea of “partial overlaps” from 
ontology to epistemology, this is not a surprising outcome. On the one hand, ethnobiological 
research often presupposes a substantial overlap in epistemic resources. For example, consider 
an ethnobiologist going into the field with a traditional expert to learn about local plants and 
their cultural significance. Such practices would simply not be possible without substantial 
overlap in epistemic resources, such as joint reliance on observation or similar ways of 
reasoning about ecological relations. As classics in epistemology from Wittgenstein (1953) to 
Davidson (1984) have stressed, disagreement can only be intelligible on the basis of substantial 
agreement. Collaborative practices in ethnobiology provide vivid illustrations of this point, as 
joint engagement with biocultural diversity would simply not be possible without substantial 
agreement in observing and reasoning about biota and environments.  
 Even if collaborative approaches in ethnobiology presuppose shared epistemic 
resources, they are also often confronted with deep and unexpected differences. For example, 
consider Marlor’s (2010) study of tensions between Canadian biologists from the Department 
of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) and commercial clam diggers of the Kwakwaka’wakw First 
Nation. As Marlor describes in detail, tensions were at least in part grounded in different 
methodological standards. For example, DFO biologists assessed clam abundance through 
randomly selected sample areas of the beach that were standardized through straight perimeters 
and assessed through an equally standardized procedure of digging clams. In contrast, 
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Kwakwaka’wakw assessed clam abundance through harvest outcomes that were not 
standardized but affected by different individual styles and contexts of clam digging. Marlor is 
careful in providing a nuanced picture of the epistemic virtues and vices (Ludwig 2017) of both 
strategies. For example, the standardized DFO method had drawbacks such as being 
inapplicable to certain areas (e.g., high clam abundance near rock walls that did not allow the 
required straight perimeters) and excluding individual expertise of experienced clam diggers, 
but also had epistemic virtues that were important for DFO researchers such as transparency 
and replicability of methods.  
 An adequate account of epistemic relations among heterogeneous stakeholders requires 
acknowledgement of similarities in epistemic resources as well as differences that limit 
collaboration and co-creation. A starting point for such an account of partially overlapping 
epistemologies has been recently developed in philosophy of ecology by Poliseli (2018). 
Poliseli’s account of explanation and understanding in ecology avoids the specification of one 
general methodology of ecological research but instead develops the idea of toolboxes of 
context-sensitive heuristics that allow researchers to grasp complex ecological dynamics. As 
Ludwig and Poliseli (2018) have argued, this metaphor of toolboxes of heuristics can be used 
to develop a more nuanced account of the epistemic relations between traditional and academic 
ecological knowledge: it would be a mistake to think that stakeholders always operate with 
identical or entirely distinct epistemic tools. Instead, some tools will be largely identical. Some 
will be related but noticeably different. And some tools will only be found in one of the 
toolboxes.  
 In spelling out this metaphor of toolboxes, it is helpful to start with salient cases of 
similarity and difference. When looking for similarities between epistemic tools, the most 
obvious examples come from general cognitive abilities such as visual perception and inductive 
reasoning. For example, consider a local hunter and an academically trained ornithologist 
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trying to assess the status of a local bird population. Both of them will rely on observations of 
birds and inductive generalizations from these observations. Indeed, these very general 
cognitive abilities are universally shared among human agents and it is hard to even imagine 
any biological knowledge that is not grounded in some of these shared basic epistemic tools.  
 When looking for differences, it is helpful to start with more high-level epistemic 
traditions that have been shaped by epistemic communities over the course of several 
generations. In the context of European science, for example, one of the most important 
epistemic traditions is mathematization (Dijksterhuis 1961) with a long history from the 
mathematical roots of the scientific revolution to current methods of computational modelling. 
Considering the highly specialized character of mathematical methods in current scientific 
practices and their increased reliance on digital technologies, it is indeed not difficult to identify 
salient contrasts with knowledge production in Indigenous and other local communities. 
Furthermore, differences can also be approached from another direction by looking for 
epistemic traditions of local communities that are often the result of hundreds of years of 
adaptation and co-evolution with local environments (Albuquerque et al. 2015; Berkes 2018). 
To sum up, the metaphor of toolboxes avoids a simple dichotomy between universally 
shared epistemic resources and incommensurable epistemologies by treating them as endpoints 
on a gradual spectrum. In fact, these endpoints are usually no more than idealizations as it is 
typically not difficult to locate some similarities and some differences between the epistemic 
tools of stakeholders. For example, general cognitive capacities like visual perception and 
inductive reasoning may be the best candidates for universally shared epistemic resources but 
also interact with their local socio-ecological embedding (Atran and Medin 2008). Indeed, the 
“theory-ladenness of observation” (Brewer and Lambert 2001; Bogen 2009) has been widely 
discussed in philosophy of science, as observing certain phenomena through scientific 
instruments such as microscopes or telescopes often requires careful theoretical training. 
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Similar experiences are familiar in ethnobiological research as ethnobiologists often have to 
acquire intimate familiarity with local knowledge systems in order to understand what a local 
farmer is seeing in the field or to understand what an Indigenous hunter is hearing in the forest.  
 Just as cross-culturally shared epistemic resources such as visual perception involve 
some differences in practice, highly specialized epistemic tools will usually still involve some 
cross-cultural similarities. For example, it is true that current scientific methods of 
mathematical modelling in ecology are the product of an epistemic tradition that contrasts with 
the ecological reasoning of many Indigenous communities. However, numerical cognition does 
not only play a role in Western science but is also a part of Indigenous accounts of 
environments, as one can see, for instance, in estimates of population sizes or population trends 
(Gordon 2004). The idea of overlapping epistemologies should therefore not be misunderstood 
as suggesting a neat division between tools that are essentially the same and tools that are 
essentially incommensurable. On the contrary, relations between epistemic tools tend to be 
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more complex and involve both opportunities and limitations that need to be carefully 
addressed in ethnobiological practice.  
 
Partial Overlaps in Value Systems 
Sustainability has become a dominant concept at the intersection of normative and empirical 
concerns about socio-ecological dynamics. While some sustainability-related ideas can be 
traced back to early modern (Caradonna 2014) or even ancient philosophy (Gomis et al. 2011), 
the rise of the term “sustainability” is a product of the late 20th century and has been most 
commonly  associated with the Brundtland report Our Common Future, published by the World 
Commission on Environment and Development in 1987. For example, Hansson (2010: 274) 
Application: Partial overlaps in epistemology can be found in our studies of epistemological 
practices in the traditional fishing village of Siribinha. The villagers use epistemic tools such as 
causal explanations, just as academic researchers: for instance, they explain the regular 
disappearance of a bivalve (locally called Massunim, scientific name Anomalocardia brasiliana) 
due to the causal effect of freshwater that kills it and periodically enters the estuary due to heavy 
rains upstream. They also explain that the Massunim reappears because it remains buried until 
freshwater is “washed away” by the highest sea tides. They also seem to identify mechanisms to 
explain phenomena: for instance, they explain the high availability of snooks (local name Robalo, 
scientific name Centropomus sp.) in some periods due to factors like freshwater coming down the 
river and displacing the juveniles growing in the mangroves, and the muddy waters that make the 
nets harder for the fishes to see, even though floodlit by bioluminescence from what they call 
jellyfishes (from a scientific perspective, probably Noctiluca sp.). They mention several components 
causally interacting with one another, organized in space and time, as in a scientific mechanistic 
model. But there are also divergences between traditional and scientific epistemic tools, showing 
the partiality of epistemological overlaps. For instance, our fieldwork data illustrate how general 
cognitive abilities such as inductive reasoning from observation are sensitive to socio-ecological 
and cultural circumstances: while academic researchers strive for multiple, replicable tests that 
allow to weigh evidence for and against a claim, a fisher may need one single, crucial test to be 
convinced to accept a new fishing artefact or technique. As a local fisherman (called Zé) told us, if 
he tests a net and successfully captures fishes, he will not doubt the net when it seems to fail, because 
this simply means that there are no fishes, not that the net is faulty. This difference may be grounded 
in the distinct outcomes sought by a fisher and an academic researcher. A fisher may be in the 
position to accept one crucial test because he or she deals with quite concrete outcomes, say, whether 
fishes are captured or not by a net, while a researcher, worrying about how well his or her methods 
provide reliable evidence on rather abstract things like an underlying causal structure, is more likely 
to feel that more tests are generally needed. 
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suggests that “it was in the 1987 report Our Common Future [...] that sustainability became a 
central concept in environmental policies. The importance of this report in late 20th century 
environmental policies cannot be overstated.” 
While explicit theorizing on sustainability is a relatively recent phenomenon, it has 
become common to appeal to Indigenous and traditional practices as inspirations and models 
for sustainable practices. In fact, the Brundtland report already argued that tribal and 
Indigenous “lifestyles can offer modern societies many lessons in the management of resources 
in complex forest, mountain and dryland ecosystems” (WCED 1987:12). Furthermore, it is by 
no means a coincidence that academic debates about Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK) 
became institutionalized in the same time period (Johannes 1989), providing a bridge between 
ethnobiological research on local biological knowledge and applied concerns about 
sustainability in conservation management and wider policy debates.  
 The co-evolution of discourses about sustainability and TEK can motivate an optimistic 
vision of co-creation on the basis of converging reasoning about moral responsibilities towards 
environments. The sustainability concept moves academic research beyond traditional visions 
of “value-free science” (Douglas 2009; Kincaid 2006; Ludwig 2016a) and fosters 
transdisciplinary practices in which moral responsibilities and wider value questions are 
integrated with empirical research. As such, sustainability also promises to move academic 
research closer to TEK, which never employed a clear dichotomy between “facts” and “values” 
and always treated knowledge about environments as a fundamentally moral issue. 
Furthermore, such an account of convergence also seems to support meaningful co-creation 
that recognizes holders of TEK as experts who can teach scientists how to weave moral 
responsibility and environmental stewardship into biological and ecological research.  
 There is certainly some truth to this optimistic vision, which has played an important 
role in creating awareness for Indigenous and traditional values in conservation practices and 
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environmental policy (Kealiikanakaoleohaililani and Giardina 2016; Johnson et al. 2016). At 
the same time, stories about complementarity in sustainability can be misleading and outright 
harmful if they contribute to a neglect of tensions between heterogeneous value systems 
(Whyte 2015). First, environmental practices of local and traditional communities are highly 
diverse and blanket characterizations of TEK as sustainable can mislead about this complexity 
through a simplistic and romanticized picture of sustainable TEK. Second, characterizations of 
TEK as sustainable also require critical reflectivity about how different value systems can lead 
to different understandings and operationalizations of “sustainability.”  
For example, consider what Holden et al. (2014) describe as the four primary 
dimensions of sustainable development in the Brundtland Report: “safeguarding long-term 
ecological sustainability, satisfying basic human needs, and promoting intragenerational and 
intergenerational equity.” As much as these dimensions suggest overlaps with value systems 
of TEK, there are also salient differences. One difference is that TEK often assumes a complex 
web of mutual responsibilities between human and non-human actors (Lewis-Jones 2016; Rose 
2002) that is not adequately reflected in satisfying basic human needs or human-focused equity 
concerns. If non-human actors are incorporated into the values of TEK with both 
responsibilities and rights, normative reasoning about environmental issues will often depart 
from Western discourses about sustainable development. Second, sustainability discourses 
tend to be geared to sustainable growth that remains compatible with long-term ecological 
sustainability and intergenerational equity. While it has become widely reflected that TEK is 
far from static and adapted to constant change (Fernández-Llamazares and Reyes-García 
2016), accounts of change in TEK tend to be very different from sustainability debates that 
often aim for balancing economic growth with socio-ecological concerns (Elkington 2013). 
 Expanding the overall methodology of partial overlaps towards value systems in 
ethnobiology provides a helpful starting point for avoiding both horns of the dilemma of 
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division and assimilation. On the one hand, the assumption of overlaps avoids a simplistic 
divide between Indigenous and Western values. Postulating an incommensurable divide is 
often factually incorrect in ethnobiology where local communities and academic researchers 
share substantive concerns such as improving of local livelihoods or preservation of biocultural 
heritage. Furthermore, neglect of overlaps in value systems can also further the marginalization 
of TEK by rejecting any common ground for meaningful collaboration in the negotiation of 
practice and policy. On the other hand, the partiality of such overlaps needs to be addressed 
carefully to avoid illusions of co-creation that are in fact an assimilation of TEK into normative 
agendas of external researchers and conservation managers. Taking transdisciplinary 
collaboration seriously requires that ethnobiologists navigate this complex web of relations 
among values that can provide resources for joint action, but also deep normative tensions that 
need to be taken seriously.  
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Towards a Political Philosophy of Knowledge Integration 
The aim of the previous sections has been to spell out the general idea of partial overlaps 
through three core domains of philosophy: ontology, epistemology, and value theory. This 
section adds political philosophy as a fourth dimension by showing how an analysis of partial 
overlaps can lead to better understanding of political dynamics among stakeholders who often 
hold very different positions of power to enforce their ontological, epistemological and value 
perspectives in collaborative practice. 
Application: Partial overlaps in value systems can also be found in traditional Brazilian fishing 
villages, even in cases of radical alterity. Consider, for instance, the Caipora, an entity from Tupi-
Guarani mythology still important in the Brazilian culture, but certainly not a part of scientific 
ontologies. This ontological divergence does not seem to matter much, however, when a 
conservation scientist finds a convergence between her values and the value systems of a traditional 
fishing community that relies on Caipora and other alike entities to maintain a sustainable extraction 
model (Almeida 2013). In several fishing villages where we worked along the years, including 
Siribinha and Poças, we heard the stories that when a fisherman or fisherwoman misbehaves in the 
mangroves, that is, his or her actions diverge from what are acceptable practices to the community, 
it may be the case that Caipora appears and makes him or her lose the way in the mangroves for 
days or even weeks. In the Boipeba community (also in Bahia, Brazil), where one of the authors 
worked in the beginning of the 1990s, this was said to happen when a fisherman extracted too much 
of the red mangrove bark used to dye the boat sails (local name Mangue-vermelho, scientific name 
Rhizophora mangle), threatening the tree survival. A conservation scientist will also be content 
enough with the idea that Caipora needs territories in order to create animals that are offered to 
hunters or gatherers, since it will echo her ideas on protected areas (Almeida 2013). In these cases, 
we can see how local and academic communities share values regarding ecosystem conservation 
that may make scientists value Caipora as biocultural heritage that sets norms against unsustainable 
practices, as illustrated by an excessive collection of Mangue-vermelho bark, despite the fact that 
this entity is not part of her ontology. But differences are all too clear, showing both the partiality 
of value systems overlap and the intertwining of ontologies and values, because the values 
underlying the norms against unsustainable practice put to use by the traditional community have 
little to do with Western notions of sustainability and the value of biodiversity. Rather, they concern 
a different moral order in which there should be a right kind of balance between humans, mangroves, 
and mythical creatures like Caipora. Partly because she is not committed to that moral order, the 
conservation scientist will probably not show in the field the same engagement with situations of 
fear and fright that are for the local communities signs of the presence of Caipora. She would not 
report, say, the same feelings a fisherwoman would describe to us when telling about how she 
listened to some voice in the mangroves that might be the Caipora calling. 
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 Figure 2 uses the idea of partial (ontological, epistemic, value) overlaps between 
knowledge systems to distinguish three modes of marginalization of local knowledge. Mode 
2a illustrates the case of marginalization through disregard of the very existence of local 
knowledge systems. This scenario has been widely discussed and criticized in the 
anthropological literature on failed modernization. For example, consider Scott’s (1998) 
famous discussion of the Ujamaa villagization campaign in Tanzania that forced local 
communities to practice “scientific agriculture”, but ended up leading to soil erosion and 
dysfunctional village structures. Or think of Lansing’s (1991) discussion of the negative effects 
of the “Green Revolution” in Bali that was driven by the goal to increase yields of rice farming 
through scientifically-based practices, but had catastrophic effects on local farmers through 
water shortages and pest spread. In both cases, the adverse and unintended consequences for 
local farmers were a product of ignorance towards local knowledge systems. For example, 
Scott (1998:226) emphasizes the “complete faith in what officials took for ‘scientific 
agriculture’ on one hand and a nearly total skepticism about the actual agricultural practices of 
Africans on the other. As a provincial agricultural officer in the Shire (Tchiri) Valley put it, 
21 
‘The African has neither the training, skill, nor equipment to diagnose his soil erosion troubles 
nor can he plan the remedial measures, which are based on scientific knowledge, and this is 
where I think we rightly come in’”. Lansing documented similar attitudes in Bali that led to the 
suppression of traditional water management through a system of connected water temples: 
“The answer to pests was pesticide, not the prayers of priests. Or as one frustrated American 
irrigation engineer said to me, ‘These people don’t need a high priest, they need a 
hydrologist!’” (Lansing 1991:115).   
 Ignorance towards local knowledge in the sense of 2a has become widely criticized 
across the biological sciences and is in many ways the starting point of the very project of 
ethnobiology. In contrast, mode 2b illustrates a more elusive danger of partial recognition that 
acknowledges local knowledge only insofar as it fits with the (ontological, epistemic, value) 
assumptions of academic researchers. This scenario has been the target of Nadasdy’s (2003) 
influential critique of knowledge integration and is reflected in Kimmerer’s (2012:322) concern 
about knowledge mining: “Knowledge mining or the extraction of useful facts from the body 
of knowledge, without exploration of the cultural context in which they belong, can do a 
disservice to the information as well as to the culture. Just as gold mining degrades a large area 
of land for the extraction of what is perceived as valuable ‘ore’ and leave a wasteland in its 
place, extraction of valuable data from traditional knowledge without consideration of its 
cultural context can also be damaging.”  
 Both Nadasdy and Kimmerer focus on the risks of an overly optimistic vision of 
harmonious co-creation in which different stakeholders bring their diverse resources together 
and jointly solve socio-ecological challenges. In many cases of co-management of local 
environments, such a picture is indeed tempting, as local communities possess a wealth of 
expertise about local environments that can complement the knowledge of academically-
trained ecologists and conservation managers. However, this integration of local knowledge 
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can reproduce and consolidate unequal power relations if academically-trained scientists have 
the power to decide when to incorporate the local knowledge in research and conservation 
management. 
Moving beyond the limitations of 2b requires recognition of local ontologies, 
epistemologies, and values even when they differ substantially from academic research. Mode 
2c represents this situation in which the intersection provides resources for co-creation and 
collaboration while the partiality of the overlap leaves room for acknowledging various sources 
of tension that suggest different actions in concrete contexts. While 2c provides a more 
comprehensive picture that detects both common ground and tensions, it does not in itself 
provide an answer to the question of how tensions should be addressed. On the contrary, the 
acknowledgement of different resources emphasizes the possibility of different answers to 
socio-ecological challenges and the political character of choosing between them when 
negotiating practices and policies.  
In this context, one core philosophical task is to move from a merely theoretical 
discussion of epistemology and ontology towards an explicitly normative discussion of 
political epistemology and political ontology of ethnobiology. The question is not merely 
whether local communities have different methods for knowledge creation and validation or 
different ontological categories, but rather what role these epistemologies and ontologies 
should have in negotiations of practice and policy. Following Viveiros de Castro (2014), 
Ludwig (2016) suggests “ontological self-determination” as a starting point for addressing 
these questions. The idea of self-determination of local communities provides a helpful contrast 
to the opportunistic use of local knowledge that is suggested by mode 2b. Rather than 
integrating local knowledge only where it is relevant for academic researchers, the idea of self-
determination inverts this relation by asking when exogenous epistemic and ontological 
resources become relevant for the concerns of local communities. 
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While the idea of epistemological and ontological self-determination provides a useful 
starting point, it clearly requires further specification and qualification. In political philosophy, 
articulations of self-determination are often tied to the assumption that policies and practices 
should be determined by the affected stakeholders themselves (Fraser 2007). In many socio-
ecological processes, however, it is far from clear how the group of affected stakeholders 
should be determined. For example, should adequate frameworks for the preservation of a 
forest be determined exclusively by local communities that directly interact with the forest? Or 
even more narrowly only those who live in the forest? Or should everyone be considered a 
relevant stakeholder in forest conservation as it is a crucial requirement for mitigating global 
climate change? Addressing such questions requires serious engagement with current political 
philosophy and debates about adequate “scales of justice” (Fraser 2009).    
 
Conclusion 
While ethnobiology has grown into a vibrant interdisciplinary field, it also often remains 
insufficiently connected with wider theoretical debates (Ludwig 2018c). Lepofsky and 
Wolverton (2018:454), for instance, note that “the reach of ethnobiology remains limited in 
scope” and argue for the need to increase its “visibility in and relevance to global social-
ecological discussions”. Although one may be inclined to think of developments towards 
“applied ethnobiology” as further diminishing the role of wider theoretical reflection, this 
article has argued that multi-stakeholder processes raise complex questions that require 
interaction with core areas of philosophy, from ontology and epistemology to value theory and 
political philosophy. Developing philosophy of ethnobiology as an interdisciplinary field can 
overcome this lack of institutionalized exchange and contribute to the development of new 
intellectual tools for addressing these questions.  
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The point is not simply to add philosophers to the already heterogenous community 
(Latulippe 2015; Wyndham et al. 2011) of ethnobiologists, which includes scholars from 
anthropology, archeology, botany, cognitive science, cultural geography, ecology, Indigenous 
studies, sociology, and so on. Rather than leading to further fragmentation of the field, 
philosophy of ethnobiology can play a synthesizing role that connects underlying issues of 
knowledge diversity that cut across various disciplines of ethnobiological research. For 
example, a comprehensive account of partial ontological overlaps will require careful attention 
to relations between taxonomies, as developed in the biological sciences, and relations between 
more general metaphysical principles, as discussed in the cultural anthropology of the 
ontological turn. An analysis of overlapping epistemic toolboxes requires attention to 
experimental evidence from cognitive science as much as in-depth qualitative narratives from 
Indigenous studies. Developing philosophy of ethnobiology can therefore contribute to 
building bridges between heterogeneous disciplinary traditions in ethnobiology and to 
addressing knowledge integration through self-reflective procedures that do not shy away from 
fundamental questions regarding knowledge diversity in biology.  
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